This paper investigates the causes of, and reactions to, the Eurozone crisis, focusing in particular on the institutional foundations of the four Southern European Eurozone countries that have encountered an acute sovereign debt crisis. Applying the basic arguments featured in the Varieties of Capitalism literature, the paper aims to show how the interaction of the institutional set-up of coordinated and mixed market economies, with the effects of the common currency area, can explain both the evolution of the crisis, as well as the reactions to it. This paper interprets the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone as the combination of two features: firstly, the architecture of the common currency area, which instituted a common interest rate for widely heterogeneous regional economies, and secondly, the specific institutional foundations of two types of economies participating in the Eurozone, namely coordinated market economies and mixed market economies. Understanding these two factors and their interaction not only helps to explain why the Southern European countries were particularly vulnerable to exploding public debt, but also why, during the on-going resolution of the Eurozone crisis over the last two years, policy makers have persistently preferred austerity over the mutualisation of debt. The compensatory role of the state in mixed-market economies thereby undermines the effectiveness of financial bail-outs for economic growth strategies.
Introduction
The political and economic interpretation of the Eurozone crisis differs significantly. In political terms, the Eurozone crisis is often portrayed as a case of fiscal profligacy and moral hazard issues. Public overspending by spendthrift governments followed political convenience and the political business cycle. Low interest rates and enhanced credit rating, due to EMU membership, enabled governments, that had previously had restricted access to capital markets, new avenues for public spending. When the sovereign debt crisis hit in 2010 and bail-outs were required to prevent defaults, the political response was to demand austerity and strict compliance with debt brakes from these governments.
In economic terms, the Eurozone crisis is commonly understood as a consequence of economic imbalances within the Eurozone, combined with a banking crisis that followed the financial meltdown in 2008. Economic imbalances are a consequence of an incomplete and asymmetric currency area, in which monetary policy is centralized but fiscal policy and wage setting is regionalised. Inflation differentials in a regime of standard interest rates led to negative real-interest rates in countries with higher inflation. They were also responsible for lowering the competitiveness of these regions. In addition, conditions over debt limits and bail-outs were unclear before the crisis. Even though the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) anticipated the moral hazard of a currency union with decentralized fiscal policy, its mechanisms were not feasible. Germany and France, the core countries of the Eurozone, both violated the Stability and Growth Pact without immediate negative consequences. The scenario of disciplining governments that engaged in fiscal overspending was not realistic. Moreover, the nature of sovereign debt in a monetary union is different compared to countries which can control monetary policy (de Grauwe, 2011) . Sovereign currency countries can use their central bank to combat a liquidity squeeze, whereas regions in a currency union cannot. Therefore a whole range of structural factors significantly increased the vulnerability of these countries. Firstly, countries benefited from low to negative real interest rates; secondly, they also benefited from the credit ratings of the Eurozone as a whole; thirdly, the emerging credit bubbles led to a deterioration in competitiveness and finally, once the crisis had struck, these countries had no instruments of their own to deal with it.
In the ensuing bail-out programmes by the various EU-level facilities and the IMF, the focus of conditionality was firmly on budget cuts combined with cuts in wages and pensions (EU Commission, 2010) . In some instances, institutional reforms regarding wage setting systems and employment protection were part of the mix. However, the biggest contribution, made by the vulnerable countries in Southern Europe to the solution of the sovereign debt crisis, was the change in domestic politics. All countries which came under attack by the financial markets and had difficulties to refinance their debts had a change in government. Two countries, Italy and Greece, turned to technocratic governments with unelected leaders, who gained credibility because they were seen and portrayed as non-politicians. The Italian
Berlusconi government was forced out by the record spread on Italian government bonds. Financial investors did not trust the capacity of the Berlusconi government to overcome the debt crisis. In Spain and Portugal the governments were changed through elections.
The rise of technocratic governments, and the heavy intervention of the Troika in domestic government budgets, have raised many concerns over the democratic legitimacy (Scharpf, 2011) as well as the economic appropriateness of the general strategy of resurrecting the Eurozone (Hancké, 2012; Armingeon and Baccaro, 2011) . Monetary integration in the EU as a whole has been criticized and called into question given the existing regional disparities (Scharpf, 2011) . A single monetary policy for a heterogeneous economic area induces diverging economic developments as they have pro-cyclical effects. This paper will not focus on these aspects. Instead this paper investigates the underlying institutional attributes of the Eurozone countries and the question:
to what extent an institutionally informed account can explain the challenges posed by monetary integration. It focuses in particular on the institutional foundations of the four Southern European Eurozone countries 1 that encounter an acute sovereign debt crisis, in contrast to the core of the Eurozone countries. It asks whether, and to what extent, the basic arguments of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature can help us to understand how the Eurozone moved into this difficult situation. Can the interaction of the institutional set-up of coordinated and mixed market economies, in combination with the effects of the common currency area, explain both the evolution of the crisis as well as the reactions to it?
As in Hancké (2012) , this paper interprets the sovereign debt crisis of the Eurozone as the combination of two features: firstly, the architecture of the common currency area, which instituted a common monetary policy rate for widely heterogeneous regional economies, and secondly, the specific institutional foundations of two types of economies participating in the Eurozone, namely coordinated market economies and mixed market economies.
It assumes that understanding these two ingredients not only helps to explain why the Southern European countries were particularly vulnerable to exploding public debt, but also why, during the on-going resolution of the Eurozone crisis over the last two years, policy makers have persistently preferred austerity and structural reform over any kind of mutualisation of debt in order to help or maintain the growth of highly indebted countries.
The argument is as follows: the Eurozone consists of a common currency area of several regional economies. These regional economies are made up of coordinated and mixed market economies. Following standard VoC arguments, coordinated market economies are defined by decision-making in key economic activities which are not market-based but rely on the strategic interaction (coordination) of large firms, their interest associations and trade unions. Mixed market economies, as defined by Molina and Rhodes (2007) , are characterized by the central role of the state in facilitating coordination and compensating for the lack of autonomous self-organization of business and labour. Labour and business have traditionally used their access to state resources to maintain their position in the political economy.
The two different kinds of political economies entered a currency union which not only removed the protection of business by national mechanisms vis-à-vis foreign competition via currency depreciation, but also gave governments in MMEs access to cheap credit. Because coordination in MMEs rested on compensation by the state, governments used these resources to compensate the losers of closer economic integration.
The development of CMEs and MMEs in EMU raises the general question of adjustment processes of economic institutions in a quasi-experiment. It particularly allows us to study the role of the state in facilitating coordination through compensation.
The institutional make-up of the Eurozone countries:

CMEs and MMEs
In a simplified understanding, one can conceptualize the member countries of the Eurozone as being broadly made up of two different kinds of political economies: Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) and Mixed Market Economies (MMEs). CMEs make up the core of the Eurozone: Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium and Finland are more or less pure types of coordinated market economies, in which key areas of what can be called market support, namely training, wage setting, firms' collaboration over R&D and corporate finance, are not governed by competitive market-but by nonmarket coordination (Hall and Soskice, 2001) . The other big group within in the Eurozone are mixed market economies, MMEs. These are political economies which also have key spheres of market support governed not by market competition but by other forms of coordination. In contrast to coordinated market economies, in mixed market economies firms and trade unions cannot deliver collective goods in the same way. Rather, they have veto power over the state and can demand compensation for state intervention (Molina and Rhodes, 2007) . Mixed market economies can be found in Southern Europe, particularly in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 2 Both types, CMEs and MMEs, are in contrast to Liberal Market Economies, LMEs, in which market mechanisms prevail and collective actors, as well as other forms of non-market coordination through chambers or crossshareholdings, play a minor role. These are typically English-speaking countries.
In CMEs, coordination takes place via two central mechanisms: the first is the tight web of institutional linkages in wage bargaining. On the vertical axis, collective bargaining behaviour is tightly connected to the competitiveness of firms. As wage setting is dominated by leading firms in the export industries, their competitive pressure shapes the bargaining outcomes on a regional or national level (Hassel and Rehder, 2001) . This is accompanied by horizontal coordination between different sectors of the economy. Wage setting manufacturing and services are tightly coupled with the exposed sectors trumping the sheltered sectors (Johnston, 2009; Johnston and Hancké, 2009) .
The second mechanism is the protection of firms from capital markets through bank-based finance and cross-shareholdings of banks and firms (Deeg, 2009) . Market capitalization of firms is low, and management is therefore not exposed in a similar way to financial markets' expectations. In the face of economic shocks, adjustment of costs takes place via wage restraint and higher work pressure, rather than numerical flexibility as is the case in liberal market economies. Firms are more protected and have a longer time span to adjust to economic downswings.
Mixed market economies can be seen as part of the family of coordinated market economies, in the sense that the economic actors, trade unions and business organizations have similar organizational features to CMEs. They often hold monopolies, or quasi monopolies, over membership domains and have privileged access to state resources. However, political and economic actors do not have similar coordinating capacities as CMEs nor do they use these capacities for autonomous coordination. Rather, organized interests use their resources to lobby the state for protection or compensation.
The set-up of collective bargaining in MMEs resembles CMEs but the actors, trade unions and employers are far more weakly developed than in CMEs.
Similar institutions therefore rest on very different collective actors.
As Molina and Rhodes point out: in MMEs unions and employers are unable to deliver the same collective goods or create strong autonomous forms of coordination (as CMEs) they do, however, frequently have the power to veto change and/or demand compensation from the state. "Levels of direct state intervention, via company ownership, for example, have been heavily reduced in European MMEs in recent years. But there has been a reluctance to abandon the protection of national firms from foreign predators. The role of the state as a compensator 'of first resort' is also still strong, depending on the access of vested interests to policymaking power." (Molina and Rhodes, 2007, 227) .
According to Molina and Rhodes (2007, 227-8) , this has profound implications for the kind of coordination that develops alongside regulation by markets and social actors. With regard to institutional complementarities between different spheres of economic institutions and the relationship between welfare provisions and the labour market, the authors make four assumptions about MMEs:
 'First, the exertion of strong veto powers by organizationally weak socio-economic interests has limited investment in specific or co-specific assets and created serious coordination failuresin wage bargaining, the regulation of the workplace, and the management of social and employment protection.  Fourth, the state's role in correcting for coordination deficits will therefore often be accompanied, and sometimes subverted by, 'compensation' (subsidies, protection) demanded by interest organizations in return for cooperation' (Molina and Rhodes 2007, 227-8) .
Assuming these characteristics of MMEs to be accurate descriptions of the state of Southern European member states, the expectation is that institutional stability in MMEs is not based on complementarities but on state intervention.
State intervention substitutes other means of coordination -both regarding market mechanisms, as in LMEs, or autonomous coordination by associations, as in CMEs. As a prime side effect, state intervention supports an economic system which pays out rents to economic actors in the face of economic shocks, rather than giving economic actors the means and incentives to adjust their competitiveness to a new situation. Adjustment to economic shocks will, therefore, take the form of political conflicts between vested interests.
In contrast, the assumption is that in CMEs clientelistic relations between unions and political parties are less developed and unions are more responsive to market pressures. They invest in cooperative relations at the plant level, to protect members and labour market insiders by protecting the competitiveness of firms (Hassel, 2011) . They have strong control over wage setting and can protect the competitiveness of key exporting firms via continued wage restraint.
If that was the case, we can make the following assumptions about the adjustment process of CMEs and MMEs in the Eurozone: firstly, we can assume that adjustment processes take different forms. While in CMEs firms aim to restore and maintain competitiveness by controlling labour costs; in MMEs economic actors will aim at maintaining protection and compensation.
Secondly, this process will be reinforced by the fact that unitary interest rates have very different effects in regions with higher and lower inflation rates. In turn, reform processes to regain competitiveness will diverge in both groups of countries.
Thirdly, the loss of competitiveness in MMEs will put pressure towards an increase in compensation. As competitiveness declines, and employment is threatened, economic actors in MMEs will use their traditional reservoir of political influence to maintain standards of living.
To sum up, both groups of countries are assumed to be on diverging trajectories of institutional and policy adjustment in the Eurozone. The effects of monetary union amplify the two trajectories, even though they would not have been fundamentally different without a shared currency. 3 It has been hypothesized that the period during the 1990s-the run-up to monetary union-was an exceptional period, as MMEs had to adjust to the conditions of the Maastricht Treaty.
Institutional properties of CMEs and MMEs
The institutional distinction between CMEs and MMEs is hard to define. As outlined above, the lack of autonomous coordination in the context of nonliberal market economies shapes the relationship between interest groups and government policy. As economic actors fail to coordinate themselves, but are sufficiently organized, they will invest their capital in political lobbying.
There is, however, no single indicator on the close interaction of economic actors and governments: indicators of close interaction might look similar in CMEs and MMEs, but lead to very different results. Relations between trade unions and center-left parties are, for instance, close in many European countries as there has been a tight co-evolution of social democratic parties and trade unions (Hassel, 2006) .
In the following, I will map out institutional characteristics in CMEs and Their concern was the ability to control wage developments through social pacts which in turn were shaped by these micro-foundations (Hancké and Rhodes, 2005: 7) . If macro-level coordination is not underpinned by micro-level foundations, they argue, they will take the form of antagonistic bargaining rather than mutually beneficial coordination. of CME averages, or even LMEs, will automatically turn these countries into
CMEs. Coordination practices in CMEs do not rely on liberal employment or product market regimes. Rather, stricter regulation of labour and product markets can be used as a proxy for political power of associations and economic actors. Liberalizing labour and product markets will, therefore, not automatically solve the problems of competitiveness in MMEs; this would be a misinterpretation. It only indicates that economic actors have lost political power.
As Table 2 shows, there is a strong difference between LMEs on the one hand and CMEs and MMEs on the other with regard to protective measures, particularly up until the 1990s. There is also a correlation between protective measures on the labour market and product market regulation. For 1990 the correlation coefficient between employment protection and product market regulation is .59. The distinction between countries, as well as the correlation between different measures, becomes weaker over time. of France resembles much more that of an MME, while Italy would fit well into the CME category. 5 This categorization would also make sense with regard to labour market institutions: France is a classic case of weak trade unions with high political influence, while Italy has had a long standing history of labour strength and increasing patterns of coordination of union activities at the plant level (Hassel, 2006, Molina and Rhodes, 2007). 6 Swapping both countries would make a much clearer case for the distinction between CMEs and MMEs within the Eurozone (see Table 2 ). A cluster analysis, which is based on employment and product market regulation, skill formation systems, as well as wage bargaining coordination, supports this view. While the two main groups are LMEs and others, the second group is divided into CMEs and MMEs. France is institutionally situated next to Italy within the group of mixed marked economies among the other Southern European countries (Graph 1).
5 For a comprehensive discussion of the Italian case in the VoC spectrum see Simoni (2012) . 6 See for a detailed discussion of the French case Levy (1999) . 
Cluster Analysis
Source: Tables 1-3 . Based on EPL, PMR, Skills and wage bargaining coordination.
All countries have moved towards liberalization over the period between 1990 and 2008. Liberalization has been stronger in countries with high initial regulation. This is true for all countries including MMEs. MMEs have made particularly big steps towards liberalization throughout this period.
Adjustment in the Eurozone has, therefore, not protected business and labour market insiders any more than it did before. Rather the opposite: during the enhanced phase of restructuring due to monetary union, regulation and protection have been relaxed in all countries rather than loosened. With regard to product market regulation, the change in MMEs has been even greater than in CMEs. On the whole, liberalization in product market regulation seems to have been greater than in labour market protection (Siegel, 2007) .
There are, however, notable differences between individual countries: Greece and Italy have not relaxed employment protection, while Spain has relaxed protection for permanent workers but increased the regulation of temporary workers. With regard to state intervention in wage bargaining, there are no major differences between CMEs and MMEs. Attempts by governments to control wage increases through state intervention took place in MMEs but not to any higher degree than in CMEs. On average, state intervention in wage bargaining declined slightly, compared to the 1990s, when governments were anxious to meet the convergence criteria (Hassel, 2006) . (Ferrera, 1996; Rhodes, 1996) 
Institutional adjustment in the Eurozone
The overarching challenge to the Eurozone today is undoubtedly the diverging development of competitiveness between different regions which has led to major imbalances (Scharpf 2011; Hancké 2012) . One size fits all monetary policy put a strain on economies with low inflation rates like in Germany and did not balance overheated economies like in Ireland. In both cases, monetary policy, oriented to an average target for the Eurozone as a whole, had a pro-cyclical effect. Governments did not use the cheap credit they accessed for economic development, but rather for consumption. Over time, current account deficits and surpluses accumulated and competitiveness diverged. These problems with the European Monetary Union were known from the beginning and did not come as a surprise to policy makers or analysts.
About a decade ago, at the beginning of Monetary Union, there were two fundamental expectations on further institutional adjustment in the Eurozone, mainly coming out of the social pacts literature. The first expectation was that negotiated adjustment was to be continued in order to maintain competitiveness, provided that governments would not use fiscal policy against economic downturns and adhere to the Stability and Growth Pact (Hassel 2006, 252) . The second expectation was that, with the beginning of monetary union, incentives for governments to engage in negotiations with social partners over wage bargaining, institutions and wage setting would decline (Hancké and Rhodes 2005, 28) .
Empirically, it has been shown that social pacts have continued to play a role during the last decade but in different forms (Visser and Rhodes 2011, 69 
Graph 3: Nominal Wage Change in MMEs and Rest of the Eurozone
Source: OECD Statistics.
The same is true for inflation differentials. During the first half of the 2000s, inflation differentials have been persistent (Scharpf 2011) . Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain all had significantly higher inflation than the Eurozone average. Germany, on the other hand, had the lowest inflation and highest real interest rates and was, therefore, held back in growth. Lower prices in Germany benefitted the competitiveness of German firms in the long-run.
While this is problematic for the Eurozone as a whole, and for the less competitive countries in particular, in comparison to earlier wage developments in these countries, the period of the 2000s were a haven of economic stability. One should recall that inflation differentials between Portugal and Germany in the 1980s were almost 15 percentage points on average (Hassel 2006, 106) . Given where Southern European countries were coming from economically, the Euro served the need for price and economic stability.
Graph 4: Inflation rates in MMEs and Rest of the Eurozone
Unemployment, on the other hand, did not converge but neither did it diverge; rather it moved in parallel. CMEs had about 2-percentage points lower unemployment levels compared to MMEs throughout the last two decades (Graph 5).
In summary, there were few economic problems for MME governments to act upon until the financial crisis. Macro-economic circumstances were characterized by stability rather than crisis, and fiscal deficits and debt were easily financed.
Graph 5: Unemployment Rates in the Eurozone
Source: OECD Statistics. The pattern in the graph above reconfirms long-standing assumptions about the workings of CME wage bargaining institutions in continental Europe. 9
The institutional basis for systematic wage restraint is coordination through pattern setting or centralized control over wages (Hassel 2006, 165; Johnston 2011 ). Export-oriented industries set the upper limit for wage negotiations, which serve as an orientation point for the sheltered sectors. Wage increases in the sheltered sector are generally lower than in the exposed sectors. A major factor for coordinating wage setting downwards in continental CMEs is the dominant position of manufacturing trade unions in a coordinated trade union system. As manufacturing firms have to stand the pressure of international competition, labour costs are a major concern of these unions.
Pay increase is exchanged with job security in leading manufacturing firms through rounds of plant-level concession bargaining. Manufacturing unions can essentially control wage developments in other sectors as well by signalling to employers, but also to governments, the standard going rate.
Other unions in services or the public sector will not generally exceed this mark.
It is, moreover, in the interest of manufacturing unions to control wages in services and the public sector as these keep costs for consumption down (Hassel, 2011) . Unsuccessful and weak public sector trade unions are, on the other hand, not attractive membership organizations. Their membership drive is, therefore, unlikely to be more successful than that of their manufacturing counterparts. As Johnston points out (2011, 29) , public sector staff associations have repeatedly tried to break out of the straightjacket of manufacturingdominated unionism. Hospital doctors' and train drivers' unions left the main umbrella union federation DGB, and the pattern bargaining wage coordination system, in order to negotiate higher wage increases. This indicates that there are tensions between public sector professionals and the disciplining force of manufacturing unions, which have so far had only limited success.
In MMEs wage bargaining does not follow a coordinated pattern, and coordination has frequently been attempted through social pacts. Spain, Italy and Portugal all had frequent social pacts during the 1990s to control wage developments to meet convergence criteria. An interesting example is Italy,
where the Ciampi Protcol, in 1993, restructured public sector pay and introduced ceilings for it (Ebbinghaus and Hassel, 2000) . After 2000, however, the public sector pay discipline was lost again, and wage increases outstripped private sector pay. Similarly in Greece, attempts were made to curb pay in loss-making state industries in 1998 (Johnston 2011, 16) . But since public sector pay negotiations are not embedded in an institutional framework that allows other actors greater levels of control, public sector unions pursue a strategy of squeezing the public sector as a sign of union success. This, in turn, helps to entrench unionism in the public sector and further weakens coordination with manufacturing wage setting. On the whole, sectoral unionization rate differentials add to the picture of power struggles between public and private sector workers. In MMEs-as economic actors strive for political control rather than competitiveness-the public sector has to be a major battling ground for influence. This is different to both LMEs and Nordic CMEs; both are types of capitalism where public sector workers' unions are stronger than those in the private sector. In LMEs the public sector has been sheltered so far from harsh anti-union campaigns, whereas, in the Nordic countries, the public sector is a central employment segment and an integral part of the welfare state.
The dynamic of adjustment in MMEs has been a combination of private and public sector pay rises, with rising standards of living for the public sector In line with this reasoning, economic adjustment programmes, for instance in Greece, contain measures on labour market deregulation, not because there is an expectation that these measures will improve competitiveness, but because policy-makers in the Troika believe that the protection and compensation mechanisms must be broken for the effectiveness of financial transfers. In Greece for instance, wage bargaining deregulation has been part of the adjustment package by the Troika, which would costs Greek society very little financially and would be unlikely to fundamentally change labour costs in Greece. However, the change in the regulatory set-up of wage setting institutions is seen as an important political measure rather than an economic one. For policy-makers in debtor countries, it is, therefore, not the economic adjustment process that is a precondition for financial integration, but the political process of detaching economic actors from the policy process.
The second major implication of this analysis is the classification of France.
France has always been a difficult case in the VoC framework. The important role of the state has led some scholars to widen the analysis for a state-led model of capitalism. 11 It would, however, make more sense to include France in the group of MMEs. Statism, as an integral part of French political economy, closely resembles the mechanisms of protection and compensation.
If France is, however, in the institutional trajectory of MMEs, the underlying problems of the Eurozone might be greatly enhanced, as the twin engines of European economic and monetary integration are Germany and France. To establish a common economic and fiscal policy framework with two countries from such different institutional backgrounds remains a major challenge, if the Euro is to survive the sovereign debt crisis long-term.
Thirdly, the distinction between CMEs and MMEs, as established in the preceding sections, runs the danger of being based on inaccurate indicators.
While some of the underlying indicators point to a distinct relationship between economic actors and policy-makers in different political economies, they do not necessarily present the best measures for the underlying phenomenon. Moreover, they are in flux and cannot be seen as fixed.
Unionization is in decline in most of these countries, and informal processes of bargaining decentralization and fragmentation can be observed.
Employment protection and product market regulation have been liberalized virtually everywhere. Lack of coordination and articulation as identified in MMEs might soon be observed in key CMEs as well, without necessarily implying the same kind of interaction between economic actors. At the same time, we know from earlier writings that fundamental institutional patterns of political economies are surprisingly stable over time (Thelen, 2004 , Shonfield, 1965 .
Finally, the main distinction between CMEs and MMEs in this analysis has been with regard to the role of the state when facilitating coordination. In CMEs, coordination is based on the business community and its relations to organized labour. In MMEs the state has played an active role by facilitating coordination through compensation. The sovereign debt crisis of several MMEs in the Eurozone has now undermined the capacity of governments to compensate economic actors during the recession. Since this was an important ingredient of these political economies, large groups of societies have suffered significantly, while others escaped relatively unharmed. It is now an open question how economic actors in these countries will regroup as their access to public budgets is severely restricted. In order to co-exist with other CMEs in a currency union, coordination is in principle the superior approach to economic management than liberalization. Liberalization is however the preferred approach by the Troika in order to undermine existing patterns of clientelism. This is a dilemma for the crisis countries and unlikely to be solved easily.
